“The simple truth was that financial institutions could no longer be allowed to fail — the links among them were [in the words of Longstreth] ‘simply too extensive to prevent one failure from triggering another.’”
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“The simple truth was that financial institutions could no longer be allowed to fail — the links among them were [in the words of Longstreth] ‘simply too extensive to prevent one failure from triggering another.’”
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“Henriques notes the crash was actually seven years in the making, and she also demonstrates how it was the predicate to the financial crisis of 2008. Sadly, investors, regulators and bankers failed to heed the lessons of 1987, even as the same patterns resurfaced.”
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“Henriques gives us a gripping, almost minute-by-minute account of the weeks that followed, including the posturings, the denials and the panics, as well as the “web of trust, pluck and improvisation” that pulled the markets through.”
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“A first-class cautionary tale that should be on every financial regulator’s and policymaker’s desk — and many an investor’s, too.”
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“a narrative history . . . rich in interviews and archival research and personalized with vivid descriptions of the actors and conflicts involved.”
“Her writing is so skillful that even mathematical risk-mitigation techniques and arcane turf wars . . . are infused with life.”
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“Black Monday was the contagious crisis that the system nearly didn’t survive. All the key fault lines that trembled in 2008 … were first exposed as hazards in 1987.”
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“Henriques argues that Black Monday, as it is known, ought to have prompted smart regulatory overhaul. That might even have helped prevent the global meltdown 20 years later, she posits.”
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